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cultural phenomena because of the latter’s creative and emergent prop-
erties.
3
 We do not think that a black male who voted Democrat in the
last election did so because of the color of his skin. Neither do we
think that there is a causal relationship at work, for instance, between
income bracket and membership in a particular political party.
4
 Any range of qualities together can constitute generalizable
conditions or characteristics of a concept that can be applied to what-
ever is deemed to comply with them. “Intensional” has to do with the
qualities that make up the idea, and “extensional” with the things or
objects it is meant to cover.
5
 I draw from the thinking of John Searle and others who discuss
the mind in terms of “intentional states.”  J. Searle (1983). Intention-
ality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
UP.
6
 I take a holist approach to selfhood and find that solipsistic
challenges can only collapse upon themselves, since all meanings are
shared, in some minimal sense. Even the self-understandings, identi-
ties, and preferences that individuals harbor can only be formed against
a background of meanings that are shared in common with others.
7
 I take from Charles Taylor’s view that culture is the key me-
dium of meaning for individuals, which he defines as the broad set of
beliefs and understandings about personhood, nature, society, and
morality that people share through their practice, even if those re-
main partly unarticulated. See C. Taylor (1984). “Philosophy and its
History” in Philosophy in History, R. Rorty, J.B. Schneewind, and Q.
Skinner (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge UP, pp. 17-30.  See also A.
MacIntyre’s very helpful discussion of this in his “A Mistake About
Causality” in P. Laslett and W.G. Runciman’s Philosophy, Politics,
and Society.  Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969, pp.48-70.
8
 See G. King, R. Keohane, S. Verba (1994). Designing Social
Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, Princeton, NJ:
Princeton UP, and for a further discussion of issues raised by this
book, see H. Brady and D. Collier (eds.) (2004) Rethinking Social
Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, Rowman & Littlefield.
For another recent statement of this ilk, see G. Goertz (2005).  Social
Science Concepts: A User’s Guide. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP.
9
 H.L.A. Hart’s famous formulation of the concept of law (echo-
ing Hayek’s writings on the ideal) remains an oft-cited conceptual
analysis of the idea, as much for the numerous subsequent attempts
to supplant it as for its own merit. See H.L.A. Hart (1961). The
Concept of Law. Oxford: Oxford UP; in addition see F.A. Hayek
(1944), The Road to Serfdom,  London. For subsequent pronounce-
ments that challenge this view see L. Fuller (1969) The Morality of
Law. New Haven, CT: Yale UP; J. Raz (1979), “The Rule of Law and
its Virtue” in J. Raz (ed.),  The Authority of Law.  Oxford, UK:
Clarendon Press.
10
 See L. Wittgenstein (1972), The Blue and Brown Books.
Oxford: Blackwell.
11
 Of course “interpretivism” is not a new phenomenon. Schol-
ars have long been urging a variety of interpretive approaches, since
the ‘60s and ‘70s (by Charles Taylor, Clifford Geertz, H-G Gadamer),
the ‘80s (by Paul Rabinow and W. Sullivan), and the ‘90s (by Mark
Bevir, and Rod Rhodes, among many others). A useful discussion of
current shifts in debates more germane to political science can be
found in the Fall 2003 issue of the APSA Qualitative Methods
Newsletter, based on its symposium on “Interpretivism.”  See also
C. Geertz (1973), The Interpretation of Cultures, New York: Basic;
M. Gibbons (ed.), (1987), Interpreting Politics, Oxford: Basil
Blackwell; P. Rabinow & W. Sullivan (eds.), (1987), Interpretive
Social Science: A Second Look. Berkeley: University of California;
M. Bevir & R.A.W. Rhodes, (2003), Interpreting British Gover-
nance, London: Routledge. Also, for a more self-conscious look at
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the evolution of this school of thought, see J. Scott & D. Keates,
(eds.), (2001), Schools of Thought: Twenty Five Years of Interpre-
tive Social Science, Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP.
12
 In some sense, this is not entirely unlike the way political
science as a discipline has actually already been proceeding, in the
Kuhnian sense of scientific progress. See T. Kuhn (1962).  Structure
of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: University of Chicago.
13
 What Charles Taylor has famously called “the epistemologi-
cal model’s hold on the theoretical imaginary.” For Taylor engaged
and embodied identity is prior to, and indeed the precondition of,
the sort of disengaged representational model of knowledge that
became influential and dominant with the rise of modern science.
The great vice of the epistemological tradition is in allowing episte-
mology to command ontology, by understating and attempting to
transcend the role of engaged embodiment in knowing, even while
being nested in the latter’s wider way of being in and knowing the
world. See C. Taylor. Sources of the Self, Cambridge, MA: Harvard
UP, 1989.
14
 See H-G. Gadamer (1975), Truth and Method. New York:
Continuum.
15
 See D. Davidson (1984), Inquiries into Truth and Interpreta-
tion. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Despite longstanding efforts of leading scholars to stan-
dardize usage of the term “democracy” in scholarly practice on
the basis of precise operational definitions, David Collier and
Steven Levitsky found a proliferation of subtypes, a  phenom-
enon they refer to as “democracy with adjectives.” Efforts to
define democracy in terms of a “procedural minimum” or those
conditions necessary and sufficient for the existence of a de-
mocracy have not produced the intended uniformity of usage
and high degrees of inter-coder reliability, but rather led to the
identification of  hundreds of subtypes, of which “authoritar-
ian democracy,” “neopatrimonial democracy,” “military-domi-
nated democracy,” and “protodemocracy,” are a few.1 As they
see it, scholars confront a dilemma. On the one hand, there is
an impulse to maximize analytic differentiation in order to cap-
ture the wide variety of democracies that have emerged across
the globe. On the other, there is a necessary concern for con-
ceptual validity and to avoid what Giovanni Sartori referred to
as “conceptual stretching.”2
The difficulties associated with defining democracy are
not unique. Rather, they are characteristic of most efforts to
define and operationalize scientific concepts. The impulse to
achieve connotative precision necessarily is frustrated by per-
vasive diversity. A finite set of concepts will never be able to
capture what is in principle an infinite set of possible observa-
tions.
In this brief contribution I wish to use the concept of
democracy and the controversies surrounding efforts to con-
struct reliable and valid data sets of democratic and non-demo-
cratic polities in an exemplary fashion. I aim to highlight prob-
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.997570
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Two implications of Wittgenstein’s analysis warrant em-
phasis.  First, the proposition that the boundaries of concepts
are usually, perhaps always, extendable.  Extendibility may re-
sult from the emergence of a novel phenomenon that resembles
an extant class of phenomena, for example the emergence of
video “games” in the 1970s.  Or, it may result from the novel
employment of a given concept, extending a concept with an
established meaning in an unconventional or original fashion
to a new domain, perhaps the extension of the concept “game”
to the field of international politics.5 Second, some instances
of a given concept will be better examples than others. That is,
concepts or classes are characterized by central and non-cen-
tral or marginal members, or graded membership.  Wittgenstein
gives the example of dice: “Someone says to me, ‘Show the
children a game.’ I teach them gaming with dice, and the other
says, ‘I didn’t mean that sort of game.’”6
When concepts are generated by means of extension from
central or prototypical members, one can imagine a statement:
“If anything is a case of x, then this is a case of x.” It is hard to
imagine someone saying: “If anything is a game, then throw-
ing dice is a game.” The attributes of dice would not appear to
be central to the concept of game, yet, dice can be understood
to be a game.A wide range of empirical studies of classification
across cultures provides evidence to support Wittgenstein’s
philosophical ruminations. Studies of American Indian kinship
systems found that kinship categories are generally based on
a focal member and then extended to other, non-focal individu-
als by means of certain rules that generate a set characterized
by graded membership and fuzzy borders.7 Eleanor Rosch and
her associates discovered that categories are generally char-
acterized by the existence of “best examples” or what she
termed prototypes, as well as other, less representative, mem-
bers. For example, when asked to identify the most “birdlike”
in a sampling of birds that included robins, chickens, ostriches
and penguins, an overwhelming number of subjects will iden-
tify the robin. Similarly, a desk chair will be judged to be more
representative of the category chair than will be a rocking chair
or a barber’s chair.8
Rosch’s findings have been replicated across cultures in
a number of anthropological studies. For example, in a study of
folk classification of pottery in  Mexico, Willet Kempton found
strong evidence of prototype effects.9 And in a now classic
cross-cultural study of color categorization, Brent Berlin and
Paul Kay discovered strong evidence that conceptual color
categories are characterized by focal, best, or purest examples
and extended to new observations on the basis of similarity
judgments. Although there is strong cross-cultural consensus
on what constitutes the “best” or “purest” example of a given
color category, individuals differ with regard to the extension
of the color category to marginal exemplars. The result is a
color category characterized by graded membership and fuzzy
borders.10
The Fuzzy Concept of Democracy
Most contemporary democratic theorists would maintain
that something approaching universal suffrage, competitive
recruitment of candidates, competitive elections, and an inde-
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lematic assumptions underlying conventional wisdom regard-
ing the essential characteristics of useful scientific concepts.3
Conventional Understanding of Scientific Concepts
Conventional notions of concept formation and categori-
zation are based on the assumption that useful concepts give
rise to clear boundaries established by essential attributes or
properties common to members of the category. Clearly de-
fined and precisely operationalized concepts are generally held
to be necessary conditions for scientific investigations of the
natural or social world.Conventional  notions are influential in
the social sciences, and the failure of social scientists to ad-
here to rigorous standards in the formation of concepts is
routinely identified as a primary cause of theoretical underde-
velopment. Thus, Giovanni Sartori reacted to the widespread
practice of what he termed “conceptual stretching,” by argu-
ing the necessity of precision in the specification of the “total-
ity of characteristics any thing must possess” to be consid-
ered an example of a given concept.
Conventional wisdom and understandings of science that
rely upon it are flawed. First, even the seemingly unproblematic
spatial boundaries of physical entities dissolve under the lens
of microphysics and can make the specification of necessary
attributes or properties problematic. Second, many concepts
defy definition in terms that would generate the clear borders
Sartori seeks.
Ludwig Wittgenstein pointed out the difficulties of de-
fending the position that concepts can be defined in terms of
traits common to all exemplars through a philosophical analy-
sis of the concept of a “game.” His discussion merits citation
at length:
Consider for example the proceedings that we call “games”.
I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic
games, and so on.  What is common to them all?—Don’t
say: “There must  be something common, or they would
not be called ‘games’”—but look and see whether there
is anything common to all...And the result of this exami-
nation is: we see a complicated network of similarities over-
lapping and crisscrossing: sometimes overall similarities,
sometimes similarities of detail.4
What for Wittgenstein connects these various enterprises
and constitutes them all as exemplars of the concept of a game
are “family resemblances.” Games form a “family” of activities
that defy any precise definition or operationalization on the
basis of essential attributes, properties, or relationships. More-
over, the boundaries of the family are not fixed:
How should we explain to someone what a game is?  I
imagine that we should describe games to him, and we
might add: “This and similar things are called ‘games’”.
And do we know any more about it ourselves?  Is it only
other people whom we cannot tell exactly what a game
is?—But this is not ignorance.  We do not know the bound-
aries because none have been drawn.  To repeat, we can
draw a boundary—for a special purpose.  Does it take that
to make the concept usable? Not at all!
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pendent judiciary are constitutive features of democratic sys-
tems. But the dimensions according to which polities consti-
tute themselves are neither constant nor universal. Indeed,
scholars are routinely confronted with systems which are
clearly more democratic than not, yet do not fit a “strict” op-
erational definition. One need only mention the political sys-
tem of Great Britain, where the remnants of feudalism persist in
the form of a partially hereditary House of Lords.
An analysis of social scientific practice suggests that many
scholars extend the concept of democracy on the basis of a
given system’s resemblance to a ideal- or prototypical core.
Having converged on a “procedural minimum” definition of
democracy that requires fully contested elections, full suffrage,
the absence of widespread fraud, and effective guarantees of
civil liberties, scholars were soon confronted with a large num-
ber of cases in which one or the other criterion was to some
degree compromised. The application of the concept of de-
mocracy to the set of observable cases generates a set that is
characterized by graded membership and fuzzy borders.
Democracies can be differentiated according to type, with
each subtype constituting a full instance of the root definition
of democracy. Hence, “parliamentary democracies,“ “presiden-
tial democracies,” or “federal democracies” all can provide for
fully contested elections, universal suffrage, the absence of
widespread fraud, and effective guarantees of civil liberties,
even as they do so in different ways. The essence of classical
subtypes is that they allow one to distinguish amongst exem-
plars of a given concept along dimensions that are not essen-
tial to its definition. However, democracies can also be differ-
entiated in terms directly related to the operational definition.
Examples include “limited-suffrage democracy,”11 “male democ-
racy,”12 and “illiberal democracy.”13
In contrast to classical subtypes, these “diminished sub-
types” are distinguished by the fact they lack one or more of
the defining attributes of democracy, or enjoy these attributes
at something less than “standard” or “ideal” levels.  The dis-
tinctive feature of diminished subtypes is that they identify
specific attributes of the case or observation that are miss-
ing.14
Once one allows for diminished subtypes, concept exten-
sion no longer follows the classical criteria of establishing
thepresence or absence of a uniform set of necessary and/or
sufficient conditions. And because the relevant dimensions
along which members of a category vary are not uniform, one
cannot construct composite measures or continuous scales.
When membership in a conceptual category is graded, coding
is not a function of strict measurement but proceeds on the
basis of judgments of similarity. The result is usually a set with
borders more fuzzy than discrete.
Moreover, because differences amongst individual ob-
servations are psychologically more salient than common fea-
tures, comparisons between diminished subtypes and proto-
typical exemplars are likely to be characterized by directedness
and asymmetry. For example, if United States serves as the
conceptual prototype for a democratic system, we would not
be surprised to find that significantly more people would agree
to the statement “Guatemala’s political system is similar to that
of the United States” than would agree to the assertion “The
United States’ political system is similar to that of Guatemala.”
If true, this suggests that the borders of conceptual catego-
ries, or empirical data sets, will be strongly influenced by the
choice of prototype. The set of all polities similar to the United
States might be judged to include Guatemala, whereas the set
of all polities similar to Guatemala might not be thought to
include the United States, a situation inconsistent with ortho-
dox understandings of the nature of scientific measurement
and coding.
Collier and Levitsky argue that diminished subtypes “are
a useful means to avoid conceptual stretching in cases that are
less than fully democratic,” and “provide differentiation by
creating new analytic categories.”15 But recognizing or coun-
tenancing the resort to diminished subtypes in scholarly prac-
tice does not resolve the supposed dilemma from which their
analysis begins. Diminished subtypes do allow for greater dif-
ferentiation, but questions regarding validity remain, as their
reference to the work of Bruce Bagley makes clear. Rejecting
the diminished democracy subtypes that have been applied to
the case of Columbia in the period 1958-74—e.g. “restricted,”
“controlled,” “limited,” “oligarchical,” “elitist,” and “elitist-plu-
ralist”—Bagley characterizes Columbia as a subtype of
authoritarianism!16
Such arguments are precisely the stuff of concepts with
graded membership and fuzzy borders. That the dilemma posed
by the two values of analytic differentiation and conceptual
validity is either false or beside the point is reflected in the
response offered to Bagley’s critique: “Scholars should be
self-conscious about the analytic and normative implications
of choosing to form subtypes in relation to democracy, as
opposed to some other concept.”17 But having argued the
virtues of analytic subtypes in terms of their relationship to
root definitions, an appeal to the normative implications of
“naming” is puzzling to say the least. It does, however, pro-
vide further evidence to support my contention that much of
the “action” in the social construction of meaning is taking
place at the boundaries of our concepts rather than their cores.
One might argue that the problem of fuzzy borders could
be resolved through more precise operational definitions. But
because scientific concepts are defined in terms of other con-
cepts, the most basic of which are every-day language terms,
this has the effect of shifting the borders of concepts but does
not deal with the inherent imprecision of any definition. For
example, studies of Central and South American “transitional”
democracies found that one legacy of authoritarian rule is of-
ten the persistence of “reserved domains” where the military
exercises power independent of political control.18 The result
has been the revision of the procedural minimum definition of
democracy by some scholars to include the attribute of  “effec-
tive power to rule,” an attribute that many felt was already
understood to be implied in the overall meaning of democracy
even if it was not explicitly not included in the definition.19
Rather than producing increased inter-coder reliability, efforts
to increase operational precision have generated new lines of
contention. The example illustrates the futility of efforts to
completely specify scientific concepts and the utility of taking
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ing the analysis to liberal norms does nothing to change the
underlying process of assimilation. In American scientific prac-
tice, “liberal” norms are merely those generally associated with
the contemporary U.S. political system. These are then applied
trans-historically to other political systems if not the United
States itself.26
Conclusions
A brief analysis of scholars’ efforts to define the concept
of democracy in terms of observable attributes that are neces-
sary and sufficient for category membership demonstrates the
futility of the effort. The problem, however, is not one of schol-
arly practice but reflects pervasive variation in the realm of
empirical observation.
Any definition establishes borders, and gives rise to “bor-
derline” cases. A large part of what constitutes scientific de-
bate takes place at the borders of scientific concepts, and rul-
ing a particular empirical observation to be  “inside” or “out-
side” of the concept’s borders is an exercise in the social con-
struction of meaning.
Social scientific concepts exhibit prototype effects and
fuzzy borders characteristic of everyday language terms. Schol-
ars from different theoretical traditions or culturally determined
contexts were shown to disagree both on where to draw the
border between democratic and non-democratic forms of rule
and on what constitutes the “best” or purest example of a
democratic regime. Nonetheless, and the point is not insignifi-
cant, debate goes on. Debate, that is communication, is pos-
sible, even though scholars are committed to, or guided by,
somewhat different concepts of democracy. Whereas many in
the scientific community adhere to the proposition that scien-
tific progress demands precision in both the definition and
employment of concepts, it strikes me that it is the resem-
blance, not congruence, of concepts that characterizes fruitful
research and indeed makes science possible.
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some things for granted or assuming them to be antecedently
understood.
With the end of the Cold War, the impact of democracy on
patterns of interstate conflict has become one of the dominant
themes in the study of international politics. A series of sys-
tematic empirical studies have concluded that democratic states
do not wage war against other democracies, a finding now
routinely referred to as the “democratic peace.”20  The research
program is interesting from the standpoint of this analysis
because most of these studies have been conducted with the
same data.21
The exertions to formulate and apply precise definitions
of “democracy” and “war” to the history of inter-state conflict,
however,  have not prevented disputes over the coding of
individual cases. Even as critics of the thesis have attacked
the inclusion or exclusion of a particular state as democratic
and/or a particular interstate conflict as a war, proponents of
the democratic peace also confront an increasing  number of
results, which they contend are best regarded as “unintended
implicatures” of the operational specifications. Moreover, a
close analysis of scholarly practice in the research program
reveals the coding process to be marked by the assimilation of
cases to a concept of democracy that is generated by a proto-
typical exemplar which itself is a product of culture and histori-
cal contingency.
As Ido Oren writes: “[I]n all studies America receives vir-
tually perfect scores on the democracy scale. America is the
norm against which other polities are measured.”22 Moreover,
not only does the contemporary United States achieve perfect
democracy scores, but despite manifest differences in the de-
gree to which the population enjoyed the franchise and the
state’s protection of basic human rights, the United States
receives perfect scores for a period extending back into his-
tory for over two hundred years.23
A review of the data-sets of democratic and autocratic
regimes suggests they were not generated by the application
of  neutral or  precise coding protocols. Indeed, on an alterna-
tive democracy index constructed by Finnish scholar Tatu
Vanhanen, the United States ranked 30th, far behind the West
European democracies with Italy at the forefront.24 What ac-
counts for the differences between Vanhanen’s data-set and
those of his American colleagues, is not so much the basic
definition of democracy—indeed, he adopts the definition of-
fered by the eminent American scholar Robert Dahl—but rather
the method of operationalizing competition and participation.
Clearly influenced by European models of proportional repre-
sentation where coalition governments are the rule, the degree
to which an election is competitive is measured according to
the share of votes the smallest parties receive in presidential or
parliamentary elections.
In American debates over the purported existence of a
zone of democratic peace, whether the concept of democracy
is extended to another state, contemporary or historical, is a
function of the “degree of difference” when compared to the
United States rather than its meeting a threshold generated by
qualitative or index measures that reflect criteria held to be
necessary and sufficient for category membership.25 And shift-
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Qualitative methods are, more or less by definition, used
when political scientists want to acquire a thicker understand-
ing of some phenomena. They are used to generate a more
detailed, more textured, more contextualised account of an ac-
tion, practice, or even institution. No doubt political scientists
might have all kinds of reasons for wanting to acquire such
textured  accounts–it would be nice (but, alas, probably false)
to assume the various reasons derived from distinct philo-
sophical analyses of their discipline.1 Still, one reason for seek-
ing textured accounts might be a concern to understand the
reasons actors had for doing what they did. One rationale for
qualitative methods is precisely that they can help us to re-
cover the meanings or concepts with which those involved
imbued actions and practices.
Yet even when political scientists set out to recover oth-
ers’ concepts, they often proceed to describe these concepts
using rather different ones; they describe them using their
concepts, not those of the people they are studying. Does it
matter that they do so? The answer surely must depend on a
philosophical analysis of the general issue of the reasonable-
ness of applying our concepts to other peoples. Alas, this
issue has received almost no attention from political scien-
